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PEKING 37

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August 29, 1973

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: DAVID BRUCE

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Ch'iao Kuan-hua

1. I called on Ch'iao Kuan-hua at Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 11:00 on August 29, accompanied by Jenkins and Holdridge. In addition to Ch'iao, on Chinese side were Li'ping, Chao Ch'i-Hua, and Chen Jo-Yun, all from Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. After usual preliminaries I asked if Chinese had received report of your conversation with Han Hsu. Ch'iao responded affirmatively. I then noted that your conversation had consisted of two sessions, one written and the other oral. In the oral presentation, you had spoken of the great importance you attached to the relationship between the PRC and US, and that you regarded it as essential to synchronize policies between our two countries. I noted that several days later you had sent a message to me saying you hoped before I left that I would see Ch'iao and Prime Minister Chou and to ask if they would not be helpful in connection with your new appointment by outlining Chinese views of the current relationship between China and the US. I added that I had been informed only this morning that on Saturday you had expected to see our Ambassadors to South Korea, India, and the Phillipines, plus others, presumably including those from the Asian region. This indicated the importance which you attach to complications on Asian affairs.

3. Turning to the timing of your assuming your new position, I said that present Secretary of State would relinquish office formally on September 3, after which your nomination required confirmation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee headed by Senator Fulbright and, if after SFRC approved your appointment, nomination would be submitted to full Senate. Ordinarily, the consent of the full Senate to SFRC report was forthcoming quickly, but I surmised during your appearance before the committee would be questioned on a great number of problems and process might be lengthy. I did not know when the hearings would commence, but they were likely to do so by next week.

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I told Ch'iao that this was background until you were confirmed and that in meantime you were known as "Secretary of State-Designate."

4. I observed also that one of the questions which would be asked of you was your views on the status of relationship between our two countries, and assumed for that reason a frank expression by Ch'iao as to this relationship would be useful to you, including reference to those areas of differences which could create problems for us. In other words, I said, I was almost asking Ch'iao to deliver a monologue.

5. With reference to relations between our two countries, Ch'iao stated that during your visit to China, especially February visit, both sides had exchanged views fully. As for actual situation in relations between our two countries, something objective existed: I was in Peking and the Chinese had their Liaison Office in Washington. This signified that our relations were "developing". As to Ch'iao's views on these relations, he felt that you had your own views and the Chinese had theirs. To sum up, Ch'iao said, he felt we both understood each other regarding our differences and area of agreement. The Shanghai Joint Communique was an example, because it both stated differences and points of accord. This was our new style - not to attempt to hide our differences, but to admit them frankly. Ch'iao credited you with having contributed much to the joint communique in the course of drafting it.

6. Ch'iao next declared that he thought "the development in our relations should be considered normal." He noted that last time he and I exchanged views we had discussed state of mutual relations as well as general situation. All he wanted to know was to ask me to convey congratulations of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Chi, as well as his own on your appointment as Secretary of State. Ch'iao said that Chinese "welcome your visit to China in October." They would be in touch with us sometime later on as to specific date. Aside from this matter, there was nothing else new which they would like to discuss with me. If anything came up while I was in the U.S., he would get in touch with Jenkins and Holdridge. He wished me Bon Voyage and hoped my journey would not be too tiring.

7. I prodded Ch'iao as to whether he foresaw any specific problems which might cause either side difficulties, other than those which might flow from the differences of opinion already

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expressed in the joint communique. Ch'iao remarked that with the differences already stated in the joint communique, new differences might appear with new situations, but that would not be strange. But there was a good point here - both sides admitted their differences and did not cover them up. We could have a further exchange of views in the future.

End Section 1 of 2

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8. I tried again to draw Ch'iao out on any problems, asking if there were any immediate issues which had not been discussed in the past or which you or your representatives in Washington had not raised with their representatives. Were there such which might cause concern in our relationship? Ch'iao replied that "as our side sees it, there is not any immediate problem."

9. Nothing else of substance emerged from the conversation. Ch'iao proceeded to ask me about how much time it might take for your appointment to clear the Senate, probably in connection with scheduling your visit to China, and I told him that the SFRC hearings might extend over several days and possibly a week. Ch'iao said that as the Chinese saw it, your appointment was welcomed by both U.S. political parties and people of different circles in American society. I agreed, noting that reaction in Europe had also been very favorable. Ch'iao said he believed that you would handle the hearings very well because your ability was high -- he admired you for this. You also knew how to handle correspondents. He wondered what the Japanese reaction had been to your appointment, to which I replied that their reaction was not yet evident but they had respect for your knowledge and would find from their standpoint your appointment would be a fortunate one. In Europe our relations would certainly be strengthened, including the negotiations going on between the U.S. and European governments. I recalled your long background in European affairs, going back to before time you had joined the government.

10. Ch'iao ended by promising a further conversation after I returned.

11. Comment: Ch'iao appeared blandly non committal on the state of US-PRC relations, but at least described them as being good and as making progress via our respective liaison offices. In view of the internal political events going on here at this time, which we have reported both in this and in other channels, it seems that Chinese at this time wish to keep their relationship with us in the background so it does not intrude unduly into whatever domestic political maneuverings may be going on.

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12. In just the last few days Chinese have sharpened their criticisms of the Soviet Union. While we are not attempting to encourage such criticisms, the pointed singling out of the USSR as an element hostile to China inevitably put Chinese relationship with us in a better light internally. We ourselves are not receiving a hostile press in Peking, although there is occasional low-level niping in connection with Indo-China and Korea. Incidentally, I deliberately did not raise Cambodian situation with Ch'iao, believing if so, he would deal with this in same way he dealt with state of US-PRC relations, i.e., "we know where our differences lie."

13. Although Ch'iao was as usual polite and amiable it was clear that he had no desire to prolong a conversation that was degenerating into pleasantries. At no point was any reference made to the Prime Minister except my mentioning instructions from you to call on him and on Ch'iao, and the message of congratulations from Prime Minister to you.

14. Warm Regards.

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